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COMPARED  WITH other industrial  countries, Japan  imports  an unusually 
small share of its domestic use of manufactured  goods. In 1980, for 
example,  imports  accounted  forjust  5.8  percent  of Japanese  expenditures 
on manufactured  products, compared  with 9.3 percent of U.S. expen- 
ditures.  That same year, non-EC  imports  accounted  for 13.9  percent of 
spending  by the European  Community.  I 
Why  Japan  imports  so little is a source of great  controversy.  Popular 
explanations  stress  the role  of both  official  and  unofficial  import  barriers. 
The Japanese  government  allegedly  takes advantage  of the openness of 
foreign  markets  while  reserving  local markets  for domestic  firms.  It once 
implemented  this mercantilist  policy through  formal  protectionist  mea- 
sures such as tariffs  and quotas. Today it uses administrative  guidance, 
discriminatory  standards  and regulations, selective government pro- 
curement,  the official organization  of domestic firms into cartels, and 
weak enforcement  of antitrust  laws. Japanese  imports  are also discour- 
aged  by unofficial  practices, such as the strong  relationships  ("invisible 
handshakes")  between  local suppliers  and  buyers, "just-in-time"  inven- 
tory practices that give nearby suppliers an edge, and an unusually 
complex distribution  system that creates substantial  entry barriers  for 
newcomers,  whether  Japanese  or foreign.2 
I am  grateful  to Morio  Kuninori,  Marcus  Noland,  and  Gary  Saxonhouse  for  comments; 
to Gregory  Hume, Dale Thompson,  and Amy Salsbury  for research  assistance;  and to 
Evelyn  Taylor  for text processing. 
1. Derek  Blades  and  Wendy  Simpson,  "The  OECD  Compatible  Trade  and  Production 
Data  Base,  " Working  Paper  18  (Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development, 
January 1985). 
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517 518  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1987 
Other observers dismiss allegations  of import barriers  as based on 
biased evidence and stress instead Japanese manufacturing  prowess. 
The Japanese make high-quality  products that both foreigners and 
Japanese prefer. While the Japanese invest in long-term  strategies to 
win foreign  markets,  foreigners  are unwilling  to make similar  efforts in 
Japan. 
Many economists also dispute the anecdotal evidence on Japanese 
protectionism.  They  explain  Japan'  s trade  structure  by the  fundamentals 
of its economic situation.  Because its citizens have high  saving  rates  and 
diminished domestic investment opportunities,  Japan runs a current 
account surplus. Because it is poorly endowed in arable  land, oil, and 
other natural  resources, it achieves this surplus  through  a strong  com- 
parative  advantage  in manufacturing.3  In this view, popular  perceptions 
of Japanese  trade  practices  reflect  minds  closed by prejudice.  Japanese 
industrial  policies, for example,  have actually  been relatively  ineffective 
or have simply overcome some unique Japanese practices, thereby 
replicating  the impact  of market  forces.4 
In a  seminal study, Gary Saxonhouse provided support for the 
explanation  based on economic fundamentals.5  Saxonhouse explained 
the trade  flows of twenty-two  countries,  including  Japan,  using a model 
specified in terms of the Heckscher-Ohlin  paradigm  and based on 109 
18;  and  William  V. Rapp, "Japan's  Invisible  Barriers  to Trade,"  in Thomas  A. Pugel  and 
Robert G. Hawkins,  eds.,  Fragile Interdependence:  Economic  Issues  in U.S.-Japanese 
Trade and Investment (Lexington Books,  1986), pp. 21-45. 
3. If Japanese  goods  were  of poorer  quality,  a weaker  yen rather  than  a different  trade 
structure  would  result. 
4.  See Gary  R. Saxonhouse,  "What's  All This about  Industrial  Targeting  in Japan?" 
The World  Economy, vol. 6 (September  1983),  pp. 253-74; Philip  Trezise, "Industrial 
Policy Is Not the Major  Reason  for Japan's  Success," Brookings  Review, vol. 1 (Spring 
1983),  pp. 13-18; and Charles  L. Schultze, "Industrial  Policy: A Dissent," Brookings 
Review, vol. 2 (Fall 1983),  pp. 3-12. For a view stressing  the role of industrial  policy, see 
Chalmers Johnson,  MITI and  the Japanese  Miracle:  The Growth of Industrial Policy, 
1925-1975  (Stanford  University  Press, 1982). 
5. See Gary  R. Saxonhouse, "The Micro-  and Macro-economics  of Foreign  Sales to 
Japan,"  in William  R. Cline,  ed., Trade  Policies in the 1980's  (Washington,  D.C.: Institute 
for International  Economics, 1983), pp. 259-304; Saxonhouse, "What's Wrong with 
Japanese  Trade  Structure?"  PacificEconomicPapers,  no. 137  (July  1986);  and  Saxonhouse 
and Robert M. Stern, "An Analytical Survey of  Formal and Informal  Barriers to 
International  Trade and Investment  in the United States, Canada  and Japan," paper 
prepared  for conference  on U.S.-Canadian  Trade  and Investment  Relations  with Japan 
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Table 1.  Merchandise Trade and Current Account Balance, Japan and Germany, 1986 
Percent  of GDP 
Category  Japan  Germany 
Manufactured  goods 
Exports  10.4  24.2 
Imports  2.2  14.2 
Balance  8.2  10.0 
Other  merchandise 
Exports  0.3  2.9 
Imports  4.2  7.1 
Balance  - 3.9  -4.2 
Total merchandise  balance  4.3  5.8 
Current  account balance  4.4  3.9 
Soujrces: Organization for Economic  Cooperation and Development,  Econtomic  Suirvey:  198611987:  Germany (Paris: 
OECD,  July  1987), Statistical  Annex,  tables  B  and H; and  Bank of  Japan,  Economic  Statistics  Monthly  (Tokyo: 
Bank of Japan, July 1987), pp.  135, 178. 
industries.  He found  that  Japan's  net exports differed  significantly  from 
those predicted  by its factor endowments  and its distance  from trading 
partners  in industries  that accounted  for only 6.1 percent  of its external 
trade.6  Saxonhouse's  influential  work  has been interpreted  as indicating 
that Japan's  trade structure  is conventional  and that, in fact, its trade 
policy does not matter.7 
Although  Saxonhouse begins his study citing the unusual  nature  of 
Japanese manufactured goods imports,  he actually examines net exports. 
And although  relative  factor endowments  may well explain  Japan's  net 
trade balance, Japan's trade structure may nonetheless be unusual 
because  both exports  and  imports  are too small. Many  configurations  of 
manufactured  exports and imports can generate the current account 
surplus  compatible  with Japan's  saving  rate and resource  endowments. 
Saxonhouse  fails to address  the crucial  question  of why Japan  achieves 
its manufactured  goods surplus  with so few imports. 
This issue emerges clearly in a comparison of Japan and West 
Germany,  as reported in table 1. In some respects the German and 
Japanese economies have similar structures. Both nations run large 
6. Edward  Leamer  also does not find  Japan  unusual  in terms  of the Heckscher-Ohlin 
model. See Edward E. Leamer, Sources ofInternational  Comparative Advantage:  Theory 
and Evidence (MIT Press,  1984). 
7. See L. Alan Winters, "Patterns  of World  Trade: Does Trade Policy Matter?" 
Discussion  Paper  160  (London:  Centre  for Economic  Policy Research,  March  1987). 520  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1987 
Table 2.  Intra-Industry Manufacturing Trade Indexes,  1980 
Twenty-one  Ninety-four 
Country  industries  industries 
Australia  0.41  0.22 
Belgium  0.87  0.79 
Canada  0.67  0.68 
Finland  0.58  0.49 
France  0.88  0.82 
Germany  0.69  0.66 
Italy  0.71  0.61 
Japan  0.30  0.25 
Netherlands  0.77  0.78 
Norway  0.62  0.51 
Sweden  0.66  0.68 
United Kingdom  0.82  0.78 
United States  0.67  0.60 
Korea  ...  0.48 
Switzerland  ...  0.61 
Source: Author's  calculations  using  the following  formula: 
E  [(Xu  +  Mij)  -  I Xij-  Mij  I] 
Indexj i= 
2 (Xi + Mij) 
where  i denotes  manufacturing  category,  j denotes  country,  and  x and  m are exports  and  imports,  respectively.  This 
follows  Herbert G.  Grubel and P. J.  Lloyd,  Intra-Industry  Trade: The Theory and Measurement  of International 
Trade  in Differentiated  Products  (New York:  Halstead  Press, 1975),  p. 22. Data for the twenty-one  industries  are 
from  the OECD  Compatible  Trade  and Production  Data Base. Data  for the ninety-four  industries  are from  United 
Nations,  Commodity  Trade  Statistics,  1980,  UN Statistical  Papers,  Series D (New York:  United  Nations, 1980). 
manufactured  goods surpluses  to offset deficits  in primary  commodities 
and services. In 1986, their manufacturing  trade and current  account 
balances were similar  percentages of GDP. But the German  example 
demonstrates  that  low levels of manufactured  imports  are  not  necessarily 
"required" in resource-poor  countries. Despite manufactured  goods 
imports  of 14.2  percent  of GDP, Germany  has been able  to run  surpluses 
in its manufactured  goods trade that were larger shares of GDP than 
those of Japan. 
The Heckscher-Ohlin  theory assumes standardized  products and 
predicts that countries will not import  and export the same products, 
that is, that there  will be no intra-industry  trade. In terms  of the theory, 
intra-industry  trade is a statistical artifact resulting from insufficient 
disaggregation.  Relying on this view, Saxonhouse has argued  that his 
use of net exports as a dependent  variable  is permissible  because his 
data are disaggregated.  However, as reported in table 2, the Grubel- Robert Z. Lawrence  521 
Lloyd index of intra-industry  trade  calculated  using  data  on ninety-four 
manufacturing  industries  indicates  that  Japan  is noteworthy  for its lack 
of intra-industry  trade  even at the disaggregation  level used by Saxon- 
house. Table 3 further  highlights  the unusual  nature  of Japanese  ratios 
of exports  to imports.  For eleven of the twenty-two  categories  (account- 
ing for 48.4 percent  of OECD manufactured  goods trade),  the Japanese 
ratios are far higher than those of any other country. The average 
industry  ratio  of Japanese  exports  to imports  in 1980  was 7.6, compared 
with  that  of the next highest  country,  Finland,  which, because of its high 
ratio  in wood products,  had an average  ratio  of 2.6. 
Other  authors  have examined  imports  directly.  C. Fred  Bergsten  and 
William Cline regress the ratio of aggregate imports of goods and 
nonfactor  income services to GNP against  income, population,  resource 
endowments, and distance from trading  partners.8  They find that the 
Japanese  import ratio does not differ significantly  from that of other 
countries  in the sample, and they conclude that Japan  does not have 
excessive trade protection.9  Bela Balassa, however, using a different 
specification  of transportation  costs and specifying  the European  couli- 
tries separately,  concludes that Japan  is an "outlier" in both its manu- 
facturing  and total imports.10  The Cline-Bergsten  and Balassa studies 
have been criticized  by Saxonhouse and Marcus  Noland for not being 
based on a clear theoretical  foundation.  1I  Apparently,  in addition, the 
methodology  yields  results  that  are  sensitive  to minor  changes  in variable 
specification. 
Noland  has tried  to remedy  these shortcomings  by using  a theoretical 
model  presented  by Elhanan  Helpman  and Paul  Krugman  that explains 
the volume  of trade  and allows for intra-industry  trade.  12 He concludes 
8.  C. FredBergstenandWilliamR.  Cline, The United States-JapanEconomicProblem 
(Washington,  D.C.: Institute  for International  Economics, 1985). 
9. A similar  conclusion  is reached  by Luca Barbone,  "Is Japan  an Underimporter? 
Some  Contrasting  Results"  (OECD,  1987). 
10.  Bela Balassa,  "Japan's Trade Policies,"  Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv.,  vol.  122, 
no. 4, pp. 745-90. 
11. As Noland  notes, we have "two studies  without  formal  models  reaching  opposite 
conclusions,  and  one study  with  a formal  model  of uncertain  relevance.  " Marcus  Noland, 
"An  Econometric  Investigation  of International  Protection"  (Washington,  D.C.: Institute 
for  International  Economics,  June 1987),  p. 6. 
12. Elhanan Helpman and Paul R. Krugman, Market Structure and Foreign  Trade: 
Increasing Returns, Imperfect Competition, and the International Economy (MIT Press, 
1985),  chaps.  7-8. z  o  o  O ', 
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that  Japanese  aggregate  exports, imports,  and total trade  are not out of 
the ordinary.  Although  Noland's work  uses a more  appropriate  theoret- 
ical framework,  he explains total merchandise  trade  volumes and pro- 
vides no test of trade  in manufactured  products  alone.  13  Because manu- 
factured  goods account for less than a third  of Japanese  imports, even 
substantial  underimporting  of manufactured  goods is not likely to be 
detected  in the aggregate  specification. 
In sum, the behavior of Japanese manufactured  goods imports  has 
not been adequately  explained.  Although  the accounts stressing  import 
barriers  and those stressing  factor  endowments  are not mutually  exclu- 
sive, a sense of the relative importance  of each is essential for policy- 
making.  If trade barriers  are unimportant  and Japan's low imports of 
manufactured  goods are the inevitable result of its macroeconomic 
behavior  and  factor  endowments,  policymakers  who commit  themselves 
to raising  imports  through  removal  of trade  barriers  could be frustrated 
and disappointed.  On the other hand, if import  barriers  are important, 
Japan's adjustment  to recent changes in macroeconomic  policy and 
exchange  rates could occur predominantly  in Japanese  exports, and  the 
Japanese  market  could remain  relatively closed. If significant  barriers 
are found, their  nature  needs to be determined.  Are the barriers  official 
or private?  Are they like quotas, so that imports  are unresponsive  to 
price changes, or are they like tariffs, so that despite their presence, 
import  volumes  will respond  to currency  changes? 
In this report  I explore some of these questions. Using a model  based 
on the theory of trade  under  imperfect  competition,  I demonstrate  that 
Japanese manufactured  imports are about 40 percent lower than one 
would  expect of a typical  industrial  economy. If Japanese  manufactured 
imports  reflected  more  typical  trade,  Japan's  manufactured  goods trade 
surplus  would be only about 16  percent smaller,  but Japan  would have 
considerably  more  intra-industry  trade. 
The model  leaves certain  questions  unanswered.  It cannot  distinguish 
between the impact  of Japanese  barriers  on foreign  imports  and that of 
foreign  barriers  on Japanese  exports, nor can it differentiate  between 
the effects of import  barriers  and the peculiar  preferences  of Japanese 
13. Data  constraints  (Noland  does not measure  factor  endowments  such  as human  and 
physical  capital  explicitly)  and the need to assume balanced  trade-clearly violated in 
practice-may compromise  Noland's  conclusions. 524  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1987 
buyers. Because there were few export restraints  on Japanese  trade in 
early observation years of the data sample, results from these years 
provide measures  of the impact  of import  barriers  and unusual  prefer- 
ences. 
In the second part of the paper I examine the price sensitivity of 
Japanese  manufactured  imports  and  find  that,  for many  products,  import 
price elasticities are as high as those in the United States. Japanese 
import  barriers  thus operate more like tariffs  than like quotas and are 
probably  due to unofficial  practices  based  on unusual  buyer  preferences 
and monopolies in the distribution system rather than to officially 
implemented  cartels or quantitative  restraints. I conclude that these 
barriers  will not, for the most part, prevent an import  response to the 
stronger  yen. Finally, I argue that Japan  must take steps beyond the 
strong  exchange  rate  to increase  the openness of its markets. 
Is Japanese Import Behavior Unusual? 
I will use a special case of a model developed by Helpman and 
Krugman  to explain  trade  in differentiated  products.  The  theory  explains 
the volume  of imports  independent  of comparative  advantage.  It predicts 
a relationship  between the share of imports  in domestic consumption 
and  the share  of home production  in world  production. 
In the simplest  version  of the model,  two countries  of equal  size, with 
identical  factor  endowments  and  access to the same  technology,  produce 
the same good: a differentiated  product, produced in numerous  vari- 
eties.'4 Each variety is produced with the same production  function, 
which exhibits economies of scale. These scale economies are fairly 
small, however, so the industry  accommodates  many producers,  each 
producing  a different  variety. In the long run, firms enter the market 
until  each earns  zero profits.'5  Consumers  in both countries  have similar 
14. For a rigorous  elaboration  of this model, see Helpman  and Krugman,  Market 
Structure and Foreign  Trade, chap. 7. 
15. Ibid., p. 132.  As Helpman  and Krugman  point  out, "The industry  [has]  a market 
structure  known as monopolistic  competition;  that is, every firm  chooses a variety and 
pricing  strategy  so as to maximize  profits,  taking  as given the variety  choice and  pricing 
strategy  of the other  producers  in the industry.  In this case every firm  ends up producing 
a different  variety  of the product." Robert Z. Lawrence  525 
tastes but a preference  for variety.  16 There are no trade  barriers  and no 
transportation  or other  transactions  costs. Trade  is balanced.  In equilib- 
rium,  there will be n firms  of equal size in each country. With  identical 
demand  curves for each variety  and cost functions  for each firm,  output 
and prices of each firm  will be the same. Consumption  patterns  in each 
country  will be identical,  with domestic  and  foreign  firms  accounting  for 
equal  shares  in the purchases  of each consumer. 
If country  A doubles in size, A will produce 2n varieties;  B, n vari- 
eties. Consumers in both countries will allocate two-thirds of their 
consumption  to A goods and one-third  to B goods. One-third  of the 
production  of A and two-thirds  of the production  of B will be exported. 
Similarly,  imports  will be one-third  of consumption  in A and two-thirds 
of consumption  in B. 
Thus, in this frictionless model, a country's share in both national 
markets  will  be proportional  to its share  in  world  production.  As Helpman 
observes, relative country size is the determinant  of trade when all 
products are differentiated.'7  The larger  the country's share in world 
production,  the larger  its share  in its home market  and thus the smaller 
exports  or imports  as a share  of GNP. 
What happens in this model if trade is not balanced?  Assume, for 
example,  that  the economies  are  of equal  size, each  producing  n varieties 
in similar  amounts, but that country  A consumes only half its income 
(O.5n  if production  of each firm is defined as one unit of income) and 
lends the other  half to country  B, which consumes 1  .5n. If indifference 
curves are homothetic (all varieties have unitary  income elasticities), 
consumers in both countries will consume A and B goods in equal 
proportions.  A trade  surplus  implies  a greater  share  in world  production 
than in world consumption,  but the consumption  proportions  at home 
and abroad  of home goods remain  equal to shares in production.  That 
16. See Avinash K. Dixit and Joseph E. Stiglitz, "Monopolistic  Competition  and 
Optimum  Product  Diversity,"  American  Economic  Review,  vol. 67 (June  1977),  pp. 297- 
308. One  form  of the utility  function,  following  Dixit and  Stiglitz,  would  be a concave and 
symmetrical  CES function.  The number  of varieties  available  potentially  can be infinite. 
However, given fixed production  costs, a finite number  is supplied  in equilibrium.  If 
varieties  are  equally  priced,  each  individual  will  consume  all  varieties  in  equal  proportions. 
See Helpman and Krugman, Market Structure and Foreign  Trade, pp. 117-20. 
17. Elhanan  Helpman,  "Imperfect  Competition  and International  Trade:  Evidence 
from  Fourteen  Industrial  Countries,"  Seminar  Paper  304  (Stockholm  University,  Institute 
for International  Economic  Studies,  December  1984),  p. 8. 526  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1987 
finding is important  because it predicts that the share of imports in 
consumption  does not depend  on the trade  balance. 
Some of the strong  assumptions  in this model can be relaxed  without 
changing  this finding.  Increasing  the number  of countries  does riot  alter 
the conclusions. Countries  may produce  both differentiated  and undif- 
ferentiated  products  and  may differ  in factor  endowments.18  Production 
costs could also differ  between countries. Assume, in the two-country 
model described above, that A products rise in price by 1 percent. If 
demand  elasticities are the same worldwide,  the share of A in demand 
should fall by the same percentage in both markets. Similarly, if the 
relative  quality  of products  from  A improves,  both  foreign  and  domestic 
buyers  should  raise  their  purchases  by similar  percentages.  Each  country 
could specialize  fully in the production  ofjust one variety.  Again, shares 
in  consumption  in  each country  and  in  world  production  will correspond. 
Three assumptions  are, however, crucial  for this result:  similarity  in 
tastes,  absence of  trade barriers, and zero transactions costs.19 If 
countries have a preference  for goods made at home, shares of home 
goods in domestic consumption  will exceed those of home goods in 
world  production.  Import  barriers  such as tariffs  or quotas  will raise the 
share of home goods in home consumption  relative to their share in 
world production. Similarly,  barriers  against a country's exports will 
lead it to consume  relatively  large  shares  of its home  production.  If there 
are international  transactions costs,  home goods will be  relatively 
cheaper  in the domestic  market  and  their  share  in domestic  consumption 
could deviate  from  that  in world  production.20 
This analysis suggests that market  shares can be explained  by pro- 
duction shares, transportation  and transactions  costs, trade barriers, 
and taste differences: 
(la)  (Mij/D  Uij) = f (Pil/Pi, Tij,  Bij), 
18. A complete  treatment  of this case is provided  in Helpman  and Krugman,  Market 
Structure and Foreign  Trade. 
19. The assumption  that  utility  functions  are  similar  and  homothetic,  so that  consump- 
tion patterns  are  independent  of income,  is sufficient  for this analysis.  If the functions  are 
not homothetic,  differences  in incomes could affect demand  patterns  despite similarities 
in tastes. 
20. For an exploration of the impact of transportation  costs,  see Helpman and 
Krugman, Market Structure and Foreign  Trade, pp. 205-09.  See also Paul R. Krugman, 
"Scale  Economies,  Product  Differentiation  and  the  Pattern  ofTrade,  "  American  Economic 
Review,  vol. 70 (December  1980),  pp. 950-59. Robert Z. Lawrence  527 
where  M is imports,  D U is domestic  use (consumption  plus investment), 
P is production,  Tis transactions  costs, and  B is trade  barriers  and taste 
differences. The suffix i denotes products and  j denotes countries. In 
this context trade  barriers  include  barriers  on both exports  and  imports. 
If we were to estimate  equation  la, 
(lb)  (MijD Uij) = A  + B(P1j/Pi) +  C(Tij), 
in the frictionless  economy, the coefficient  C would  be zero, A would  be 
1.0, andB would  be -  1.0. In this case, if (Pij/Pi)  is zero, the country  does 
not produce  the product, and (Mij/DUij) would be 1-all  doinestic use 
would  be imported.  If (Pij/Pi)  is unity, the country  accounts  for all global 
production,  and (Mij/D  Uij)  would  be zero-none  of domestic use would 
be imported.  In the real world, however, in the presence of frictions, 
transportation  costs, and nonlinear  relationships,  coefficients will not 
equal unity. Nonetheless, the coefficients on both the distance and 
production  shares  variables  are expected to be negative. 
A  SECOND  SPECIFICATION 
In the frictionless model outlined above, the shares of a country's 
products  in  its domestic  market  will  equal  its shares  in  the  foreign  market. 
Thus export shares in foreign consumption  should equal the share of 
home  goods in domestic  consumption,  and  foreign  market  shares  should 
offer  an  alternative  method  forjudging  import  shares.  Indeed,  this  theory 
has some popular appeal. When the semiconductor industry in the 
United States argues that Japan follows discriminatory  practices, its 
spokesmen  point to the high shares of U.S. semiconductor  products  in 
the United States and other foreign markets  in support of their case. 
Similarly,  those defending  Japan  from  allegations  that  it is discriminating 
against  foreign  goods point to Japanese success in foreign markets  in 
electronics and motor vehicles as evidence that Japan simply makes 
better  products.  Again, differences  in tastes, trade  barriers,  and trans- 
actions  costs could influence  the results. 
This analysis  suggests  a second equation: 
(2)  (Mij/D  Uij) = f(XijlFUi,  Tij,  Bij), 
where  X denotes  exports, and  FU denotes the use of i in countries  other 
thanj. 528  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1987 
IMPLEMENTATION 
With a satisfactory  proxy for international  transactions  costs, esti- 
mating  equations la or 2 without explicit measures for Bij  will capture 
the relationship  typical  of countries  in the sample  between imports  and 
production  shares (and  export performance)  inclusive of the impact of 
normal  trade  barriers  and taste differences. A country  dummy  variable 
will not indicate  the total impact  of trade  barriers  and taste differences. 
It indicates  the impact  of only those trade  barriers  and  taste differences 
that are unusual. A negative dummy variable indicates the aggregate 
impact of three kinds of unusual behavior: unusual preferences for 
domestic goods, abnormally  high import  barriers,  and unusual  foreign 
discrimination  against  the dummied  country's  exports. 
For estimating  equations la and 2, I exploit a data set that details 
national  manufacturing  production  and  trade  between 1970  and 1983  for 
thirteen countries matched at a fairly disaggregated  level,  with the 
manufacturing  sector divided into twenty-two industries.21 Domestic 
use (consumption  plus investment)  for each country in the sample is 
estimated  using  the formula 
(3)  ~~~~DUlj  = Plj -  Xlj +  MIJ. 
I assume that transportation  and other transactions  costs (Tij)  are 
related to the distance of each country from its trading  partners.  The 
distances from national economic centers are weighted by shares in 
manufacturing  production  and  domestic  use. The variable  is specified  in 
logarithmic  form  to capture  the notion  that  costs do not increase  linearly 
with  distance.  A squared  term  is tried  to allow  for  further  nonlinearities.22 
21. The data must be treated  with some caution. They are converted  using current 
exchange  rates rather  than purchasing-power  measures.  For a detailed  description,  see 
Blades  and  Simpson,  "The OECD  Compatible  Trade  and  Production  Data  Base." 
22. The distance  variable  Dj  is weighted  as 
E (2Pk  +  2DUk) 
E  -(Pk+  -DUk) 
DISTjk 
where  Pk is the production  of country  k, DUk is the domestic  use of country  k, and  DISTjk 
is the  distance  between  countriesj  and  k.  This  weighting  method  follows  Gary  Saxonhouse, Robert Z. Lawrence  529 
RESULTS 
After  determining  the most appropriate  functional  form  (a logarithmic 
specification  gave the best results), I entered  a dummy  variable  equal  to 
unity  in the case of Japan.  The results  of the twenty-one  regressions  run 
on 1980  data  for each industry  are reported  in table  4.23 The amount  of 
variance explained excluding the Japanese observation is high (the 
average  R2  is 0.77). Almost all the coefficients are correctly signed and 
most are significantly  different  from  zero. The coefficient  on production 
suggests  considerably  more  bias toward  production  for the home market 
than  the  frictionless  model  would  suggest.  In contrast  to the proportional 
relationship  in the frictionless model, on average in the twenty-one 
industries  used in the estimation,  countries  supplied  60 percent  of their 
home market  while accounting  for 8 percent of the sample  production. 
Evaluated  at their  means, the typical  coefficient  of - 0.35 implies  that a 
1  percentage  point  rise in production  share  (for  example,  from  8 percent 
to 9 percent)  lowers the import  share  by 1.8 percentage  points (from  40 
percent  to 38.2 percent). 
Equation  standard  errors average 36 percent. In sixteen of twenty- 
one equations the dummy variable on the Japanese observation is 
negative;  in nine  of these the t-ratio  is greater  than  2; in five others it lies 
between 1  and  2. The  industries  with significant  and  negative  coefficients 
account for 49.9 percent of Japanese manufacturing  production (and 
56.6 percent of Japanese manufactured  goods trade). Japan's imports 
are significantly  higher than predicted in only one case, nonferrous 
metals. No unusual barriers  appear (coefficients positive or close to 
zero)  in the equations  for aerospace, drugs,  chemicals, food, shipbuild- 
ing, and  petroleum  refineries. 
The export shares specification, reported in table 5,  also yields 
"What's  Wrong  with  Japanese  Trade  Structure?";  Pentti  Poyhonen,  "A Tentative  Model 
for the Volume  of Trade  between  Countries,"  Weltwirtschaftlichles  Archiv.,  vol. 90, nIo. 1 
(1960),  pp.  93-99;  and  Edward  E. Leamer,  "The  Commodity  Composition  of International 
Trade in Manufactures:  An Empirical  Analysis," Oxford  Economic Papers, vol. 26 
(November  1974),  pp. 350-74. 
23. Data  peculiarities  (a share  of imports  in domestic  use greater  than  unity  in a large 
number  of cases) led to dropping  the industrial  category  for miscellaneous  manufacturing 
from  these tests. Table 4.  Tests on Japanese Import Shares in Domestic Use, Production Share 
Specification, 1980a 
Production  Japan  Summary  statistic 
Distance  share  dummy  Standard 
Industry  Distance  squared  variable  variable  error  R2 
Aerospace  -0.60  . .  .  -0.10  0.87  0.70  0.47 
(-  1.6)  (-2.1)  (1.0) 
Office machinery,  -0.47  . ..  -0.24  -0.60  0.40  0.69 
computers  (-2.4)  (-3.4)  (-1.2) 
Electronic  components  -0.30  . ..  -0.28  -1.26  0.27  0.79 
(-2.2)  (-5.4)  (-3.5) 
Drugs,  medicines  -0.58  .  ..  -0.45  0.58  0.31  0.89 
(-  3.7)  (-7.5)  (1.4) 
Instruments  -0.54  ...  -0.27  -0.59  0.35  0.80 
(-3.1)  (-4.6)  (-1.3) 
Electrical  machinery  -0.42  . .  .  -0.37  -1.10  0.21  0.90 
(-4.0)  (-7.9)  (-4.0) 
Motor vehicles  -0.36  . .  .  -0.22  -2.75  0.33  0.73 
(-2.1)  (-4.1)  (-6.5) 
Chemicals  -6.4  0.37  -0.35  -0.48  0.26  0.85 
(-  2.2)  (2.0)  (-5.9)  (-1.3) 
Nonelectrical  machinery  -0.33  .  .  .  -0.38  -1.20  0.26  0.85 
(-2.5)  (-6.6)  (-3.5) 
Rubber, plastics  -0.45  . .  .  -0.37  -1.61  0.29  0.84 
(-3.1)  (-5.7)  (-4.3) 
Nonferrous  metals  5.90  -0.46  -0.09  1.43  0.32  0.90 
(1.6)  (-2.0)  (-0.9)  (3.3) 
Other transport  -0.26  ...  -0.28  -1.95  0.50  0.55 
(-1.0)  (-2.8)  (-3.1) 
Stone,  clay,  glass  -0.52  ..  .  -0.30  -1.44  0.36  0.70 
(-2.9)  (-3.3)  (-3.1) 
Food,  beverages  -0.80  . ..  -0.10  0.32  0.36  0.71 
(-4.5)  (-1.0)  (0.7) 
Shipbuilding  -0.32  . ..  -0.50  0.34  0.29  0.81 
(-2.2)  (-5.6)  (0.9) 
Petroleum refineries  -14.80  0.91  -0.43  -0.17  0.61  0.71 
(-2.1)  (2.0)  (-3.2)  (-0.2) 
Ferrous metals  -0.75  . .  .  -0.30  -1.21  0.32  0.81 
(-4.6)  (-3.8)  (-2.9) 
Fabricated metal  -0.68  . ..  -0.43  -1.33  0.20  0.95 
products  (-6.6)  (-9.0)  (-5.1) 
Paper, printing  -14.20  0.87  -0.17  -1.17  0.51  0.64 
(-2.3)  (2.2)  (-1.0)  (-1.6) 
Wood,  cork, furniture  -15.50  0.94  0.03  -0.75  0.35  0.79 
(-3.4)  (3.2)  (0.2)  (-  1.4) 
Clothing,  shoes  -6.70  0.40  -0.30  -0.55  0.25  0.88 
(-2.3)  (2.1)  (-5.5)  (-1.5) 
Source:  Author's  calculations.  See  text  description  and equation  lb.  The  data are from the  OECD  Compatible 
Trade and Production Data Base. 
a.  The dependent  variable is market share in each industry i for each country j,  MVjIDUijQ  where M is imports and 
DU  is domestic  use  (consumption  plus investment)  computed  using equation 3. Independent  variables are distance, 
defined as the distance  of each  country's  national economic  center from its trading partners, weighted  by shares in 
manufacturing production and domestic  use; share in production in the world economy,  defined as PjjIPi.  The Japan 
dummy  variable  equals  one  for  the  case  of  Japan.  All  variables  are  in logarithms.  Numbers  in  parentheses  are 
t-statistics. Table 5.  Tests on Japanese Import Shares in Domestic Use, Export Share Specification, 
1980a 
Expor-t  Japan  Summaty  statistic 
Distance  share  dummy  Standard 
Industry  Distance  squared  variable  var-iable  error  R2 
Aerospace  -0.79  . .  .  -0.12  0.77  0.78  0.38 
(-2.0)  (-1.3)  (0.8) 
Office machinery,  -0.67  .  ..  -0.23  -0.58  0.41  0.67 
computers  (-3.2)  (-3.2)  (-1.1) 
Electronic  components  -0.53  .  ..  -0.25  -1.01  0.37  0.58 
(-2.6)  (-3.2)  (-1.8) 
Drugs,  medicines  -0.91  ...  -0.39  0.05  0.47  0.74 
(-3.7)  (-4.4)  (0.09) 
Instruments  -0.79  . ..  -0.31  -0.38  0.40  0.74 
(-3.9)  (-  3.8)  (-0.7) 
Electrical  machinery  -0.77  . .  .  -0.34  -0.82  0.28  0.83 
(-5.2)  (-5.7)  (-2.1) 
Motor vehicles  -0.59  ..  .  -0.20  -2.6  0.40  0.60 
(-  2.9)  (-3.0)  (-4.8) 
Chemicals  -9.1  0.53  -0.35  -0.77  0.30  0.83 
(-2.6)  (2.4)  (-4.7)  (-4.7) 
Nonelectrical  machinery  -0.56  . .  .  -0.34  -1.18  0.35  0.75 
(-3-1)  (-4.7)  (-2.6) 
Rubber, plastics  -0.99  . ..  -0.33  -1.26  0.37  0.73 
(-4.6)  (-3-9)  (-2.4) 
Nonferrous  metals  -1.3  . .  .  -0.01  1.01  0.38  0.85 
(-7.0)  (-0.1)  (2.2) 
Other transport  -0.53  . .  .  -0.22  -1.57  0.56  0.44 
(-1.9)  (-2.1)  (-2.0) 
Stone,  clay,  glass  -0.82  . ..  -0.24  -1.32  0.40  0.63 
(-3.7)  (-2.7)  (-2.4) 
Food,  beverages  -0.82  ...  0.01  0.22  0.37  0.68 
(-4.4)  (0. 1)  (0.5) 
Shipbuilding  -0.46  . .  .  -  0.49  0.66  0.36  0.69 
(-  2.5)  (-4.0)  (1.2) 
Petroleum refineries  -  24.57  1.5  -0.53  -1.52  0.78  0.54 
(-2.7)  (2.6)  (-1.8)  (-1.4) 
Ferrous metals  -0.96  .  ..  -0.24  -1.07  0.45  0.63 
(-3.9)  (-1.6)  (-1.5) 
Fabricated metal  -1.19  . .  .  -0.42  -1.05  0.28  0.90 
products  (-8.0)  (-6.1)  (-2.8) 
Paper, printing  -0.78  ..  .  -0.38  -0.68  0.49  0.63 
(-3-1)  (-3.0)  (-  1.1) 
Wood,  cork, furniture  -14.56  0.88  -0.02  -0.69  0.36  0.79 
(-2.9)  (2.7)  (-1.1)  (-1.4) 
Clothing, shoes  -9.33  0.54  -0.27  -0.56  0.38  0.74 
(2.1)  (2.0)  (- 3-1)  (-  1.0) 
Source:  Author's estimates  of equation 2 with data from the OECD Compatible Trade and Production Data Base. 
a.  The equation is exactly  as specified in table 4 except  that the production share variable is replaced by an export 
share variable (XU/FUij), where  X  denotes  exports  and FU  is  foreign  use.  All  variables  are  in logs.  Numbers  in 
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Table 6.  Pooled Regressions Explaining Import Share in Domestic Use,  1970, 1980, 
and 1983a 
Japan  ProductionSlummary  statistic 
dumnmy Production  Export  Standard 
Year  and equation  Distance  variable  share  share  error  R2 
1970 
Production  share  equation  - 0.44  -0.64  -0.39  ...  0.67  0.62 
(-5.7)  (-3.5)  (-15.4) 
Export  share equation  -0.75  -0.71  ...  -0.27  0.81  0.44 
(-7.9)  (-3.2)  (-8.6) 
1980 
Production  share equation  -0.53  -0.55  -  0.33  . .  .  0.60  0.62 
(-8.0)  (-  3.2)  (-12.7) 
Export  share  equation  -0.72  -0.80  ...  -0.18  0.72  0.46 
(-8.9)  (-4.0)  (-5.8) 
1983 
Production  share equation  -0.64  -  0.58  -  0.35  . .  .  0.65  0.62 
(-7.6)  (-3.2)  (-12.3) 
Export  share equation  -0.93  -0.86  ...  -0.15  0.79  0.46 
(-9.0)  (-3.9)  (-4.7) 
Source:  Author's  calculations.  See  tables 4 and 5. 
a.  Data for the twenty-one  industries from the sample of thirteen countries  were concatenated  to create variables 
with 273 observations  each. The results reported here, therefore, are summary measures for the results of the twenty- 
one  regressions  reported in tables 4 and 5. All variables are in logs.  Numbers  in parentheses  are t-statistics. 
generally significant coefficients, although it explains less  variance 
(average  R2 of 0.68) and  has higher  standard  errors  (average  43 percent). 
Negative  coefficients  on the Japanese  dummy  occur  in sixteen  of twenty- 
one industries,  with coefficients  that  are statistically  significant  in seven 
industries  (electrical  and  nonelectrical  machinery;  motor  vehicles; other 
transportation;  stone, clay, and  glass;  rubber  and  plastics;  and  fabricated 
metals). This test  suggests statistically unusual import behavior in 
products  accounting  for 20 percent  of production. 
The industry  data  have been pooled into single  regressions,  each with 
273 observations, constraining  the coefficients to be  similar for all 
industries. These equations, reported  in table 6 for different  periods, 
have highly  significant  coefficients.  The production  shares  specification 
explains about 60 percent of the sample variance, the export shares 
about 45 percent. The coefficients are relatively stable over time. In 
every case,  the coefficient of the Japanese dummy is negative and 
significant.  The typical value on the dummy variable (-0.60)  in the 
production  share  specification  indicates  that  Japanese  import  shares  are 
unusually  low by about  45 percent. 
Data  on the members  of the European  Community  in the sample  have Robert Z. Lawrence  533 
Table 7.  Pooled Regressions Explaining Import Share in Domestic Use with European 
Community Countries Aggregated,  1980a 
Japan  Summary  statistic 
Production  dummy  Standard 
Specification  Distance  share  variable  error  R2 
Pooled  regression  -0.20  -0.33  -0.89  0.66  0.61 
(-1.3)  (-7.3)  (-4.0) 
Total transportb  -0.38  -0.23  -1.54  0.36  0.80 
(-1.2)  (-2.7)  (-3.4) 
Total nonelectrical  machineryc  -0.17  -0.37  -1.16  0.39  0.85 
(-0.5)  (-4.0)  (-2.4) 
Electrical  machinery and componentsd  -0.24  -0.28  -1.39  0.16  0.96 
(-  1.8)  (-7.5)  (-7.0) 
Chemicals  and drugse  -0.13  -0.41  -0.37  0.25  0.94 
(-0.6)  (-6.3)  (-1.2) 
Instruments  -0.09  -0.28  -0.96  0.35  0.85 
(-0.3)  (-3.9)  (-2.2) 
Rubber, plastic  -0.36  -0.37  -  1.64  0.20  0.96 
(-1.9)  (-6.8)  (-6.5) 
Nonferrous  metals  -2.0  0.23  1.01  0.37  0.89 
(-  5.4)  (1.8)  (2.2) 
Stone,  clay,  glass  -0.19  -0.36  -1.50  0.24  0.92 
(-0.8)  (-5.0)  (-4.9) 
Food,  beverages  -0.39  -0.08  0.01  0.18  0.80 
(-  2.3)  (-  1.4)  (0.02) 
Ferrous metals  -0.97  -0.21  -1.24  0.27  0.93 
(-3.7)  (-2.7)  (-3.6) 
Fabricated metal products  -0.50  -0.39  -1.58  0.18  0.97 
(-3.0)  (-7.9)  (-7.0) 
Paper, printing  0.48  -0.26  -1.17  0.63  0.34 
(0.9)  (-1.3)  (-1.5) 
Wood,  cork, furniture  0.10  -0.03  -0.61  0.48  0.02 
(0.3)  (-0.2)  (-1.0) 
Clothing, shoes  -0.12  -0.31  -0.59  0.30  0.88 
(-0.4)  (-4.2)  (-1.6) 
Source:  Author's  calculations. 
a. The  equations  are  as specified  in table  4, except  that  members  of the European  Community  have  been  aggregated 
into  a single  unit,  thereby  reducing  the country  sample  to eight.  Data  for  only  fourteen  industry  groups  were  available; 
thus  the pooled  regression  equation  contains  112  observations.  All variables  are in logs. Numbers  in parentheses  are 
t-statistics. 
b. Aerospace,  motor  vehicles, other  transportation,  and shipbuilding  categories. 
c. Office  machinery,  computers,  and nonelectrical  machinery. 
d. Electronic  components  and  electrical  machinery. 
e. Chemicals,  drugs,  and medicine. 
been aggregated  into a single  unit  and  the dependent  variable  entered  as 
the share  of extra-EC  imports  in domestic consumption,  thus reducing 
the sample to eight economies. Data constraints  required  aggregating 
certain  industry  groups  so that  only fourteen  industry  regressions  could 
be run. As reported  in table 7, the equation  pooling industry  data into 
variables  with (8 x  14) 112  observations  yields a large  and statistically 534  Brookings Papers  on Econonzic Activity,  2:1987 
Table 8.  Pooled Regressions Explaining Share of Aggregate Manufactured Imports 
in Domestic Use of Manufactured Goods, 1970, 1980, and 1983a 
Japan  Production  Summary  statistic 
dummy  Production  Export  Standard 
Year  and equation  Distance  variable  share  share  error  R2 
1970 
Production  share equation  -0.42  -0.51  -  0.40  . .  .  0.26  0.88 
(-3.3)  (-1.7)  (-6.9) 
Export  share equation  -0.66  -0.51  ..  .  -0.44  0.36  0.74 
(-3.5)  (-1.1)  (-4.2) 
1980 
Production  share equation  -0.50  -0.53  -0.29  ..  .  0.24  0.83 
(-4.2)  (-  1.7)  (-4.8) 
Export  share equation  -0.68  -0.51  ..  .  -0.29  0.31  0.72 
(-4.2)  (-1.2)  (-3.2) 
1983 
Production  share equation  -0.65  -0.61  -0.26  . .  .  0.24  0.85 
(-4.5)  (-1.9)  (-4.5) 
Export  share equation  -  0.87  -0.55  ..  .  -0.26  0.31  0.74 
(-4.7)  (-1.3)  (-2.9) 
Source: Author's  calculations  with  aggregate  industry  data. 
a. Variables  are as defined  in tables  4 and  5. All variables  are in logs. Numbers  in parentheses  are t-statistics. 
significant  estimate  of Japanese  underimporting.  Regressions  for single 
industries  give results similar  to those in table  4. 
A second  set of summary  equations  examines  aggregate  manufactured 
imports,  production,  domestic  use, and exports. As reported  in table 8, 
these equations  yield less precise coefficients  but ones similar  to those 
of the pooled disaggregated  version. Japanese imports in the  1980 
production  shares  specification  were 40 percent  lower than  predicted. 
Table  9 reports  the results of estimating  the equations  in tables 4 and 
5 for different  periods. The estimates of the Japanese  dummies  in these 
periods  are similar. 
Table 10 reports the dummy  variables  on each other country in the 
sample  when these variables  are used in the pooled regressions. In the 
1980  production  share specification,  only Finland  and Japan  underim- 
ported significantly.24  In the export share specification, the only two 
24. The presence of significant  country  dummies  could indicate  heteroskedasticity. 
As Barbone  notes, "This  exercise is questionable  on econometric  grounds.  The value of 
the dummy  for each country  is in fact to be understood  as conditional  on the hypothesis 
that  other  country  dummies  are  not significantly  different  from  zero, a hypothesis  rejected 
by any other  significant  value." Barbone,  "Is Japan  an Underimporter?" Robert Z. Lawrence  535 
Table 9.  Coefficients on Japan Dummy Variables from Import Share Equations, 
1970, 1980, 1983a 
Production  share model  Export  share model 
Industry  1970  1980  1983  1970  1980  1983 
Aerospace  1.16  0.75  0.92  1.35  0.69  0.90 
(1.  1)  (0.9)  (1.  1)  (1.5)  (0.7)  (0.9) 
Office  machinery,  0.08  - 0.60  -0.67  0.28  -0.58  -0.52 
computers  (0.  1)  (-1.2)  (-1.4)  (0.5)  (-1.  1)  (-0.9) 
Electronic  components  -  1.23  -  1.26  -1.58  -0.93  -1.00  -1.45 
(-2.7)  (-3.5)  (-4.7)  (-1.3)  (-1.8)  (-3.2) 
Drugs,  medicines  0.78  0.58  0.45  0.12  0.05  -0.08 
(1.4)  (1.4)  (1.  1)  (0.  1)  (0.09)  (-0.  1) 
Instruments  -0.58  -0.59  -0.56  -0.41  - 0.38  -0.37 
(-1.0)  (-1.3)  (-0.9)  (-0.6)  (-0.71)  (-0.5) 
Electrical  machinery  -0.70  -1.10  -1.27  -0.39  -0.82  -1.05 
(-1.8)  (-4.0)  (-4.2)  (0.7)  (-2.1)  (-2.4) 
Motor  vehicles  -2.79  -2.75  - 2.89  -2.84  -2.55  -2.71 
(-4.0)  (- 6.5)  (-6.4)  (-3.4)  (-4.8)  (-4.8) 
Chemicals  -0.30  -0.48  -0.36  -0.40  -0.77  -0.56 
(-0.9)  (-1.3)  (-1.0)  (-0.9)  (-1.9)  (-1.4) 
Nonelectrical  machinery  -0.63  -1.20  -1.40  -0.75  -1.18  -1.28 
(-  1.6)  (-3.5)  (-4.7)  (-1.6)  (-2.6)  (-3.0) 
Rubber,  plastics  - 2.06  -1.61  -  1.65  -1.47  -1.26  -1.32 
(-4.1)  (-4.3)  (-5.0)  (-2.2)  (-2.4)  (-2.8) 
Nonferrous  metals  0.83  1.43  2.42  0.71  1.02  2.09 
(1.2)  (3.3)  (3.7)  (1.  1)  (2.2)  (3.3) 
Other  transport  -2.54  -1.75  -2.86  -1.62  -1.57  -2.32 
(-3.2)  (-3.1)  (-5.4)  (-1.6)  (-2.0)  (-3.4) 
Stone, clay, glass  -1.42  -1.44  -1.20  -0.99  -1.32  -1.11 
(-2.8)  (-3.1)  (-2.6)  (-1.6)  (-2.4)  (-1.9) 
Food, beverages  0.21  0.32  0.25  0.10  0.22  0.13 
(0.7)  (0.7)  (0.4)  (0.3)  (0.5)  (0.2) 
Shipbuilding  -1.07  0.34  -0.97  -1.24  0.66  -1.50 
(-1.5)  (0.9)  (-  1.2)  (-1.  1)  (1.2)  (-1.5) 
Petroleum  refineries  0.27  -0.17  -0.69  -0.90  -1.52  -2.44 
(0.4)  (-0.2)  (-0.7)  (-1.0)  (-1.4)  (-1.9) 
Ferrous  metals  -0.97  -1.21  -0.29  -0.65  -1.07  -0.17 
(-2.4)  (-2.9)  (-0.4)  (-0.9)  (-1.5)  (-0.1) 
Fabricated  metal  -  1.16  -1.33  -1.22  -0.89  -1.05  -0.99 
products  (-2.4)  (-5.1)  (-5.1)  (-1.5)  (-2.8)  (-2.4) 
Paper,  printing  - 1.46  -1.17  -1.08  -0.84  -0.68  -0.59 
(-2.4)  (-1.6)  (-1.5)  (-1.4)  (-  1.1)  (-0.9) 
Wood, cork, furniture  - 1.01  -0.75  -0.86  -0.82  -0.69  -0.82 
(-3.4)  (-1.4)  (-2.0)  (-2.8)  (-1.4)  (-2.2) 
Clothing,  shoes  -0.88  -0.55  -0.69  -0.35  -0.56  -0.70 
(-1.9)  (-1.5)  (-1.9)  (-0.6)  (-1.0)  (-1.2) 
Source:  Author's calculations. 
a.  Equations specified as in tables 4 (production share model) and 5 (export  share model) for the years  indicated. 
Numbers in parentheses  are t-statistics. 536  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1987 
Table 10.  Coefficients on Country Dummy Variables from Pooled Import Share 
Equations,  1970, 1980, 1983a 
Production  share model  Export share model 
Country  1970  1980  1983  1970  1980  1983 
Australia  0.74  0.42  0.28  1.30  1.62  1.60 
(3.5)  (1.9)  (1.2)  (5.0)  (6.9)  (6.2) 
Belgium  0.15  0.10  0.07  0.46  0.39  0.41 
(0.9)  (0.7)  (0.4)  (2.2)  (2.2)  (2.0) 
Canada  0.46  0.33  0.21  0.41  0.19  -0.16 
(2.9)  (2.3)  (1.3)  (2.1)  (1.1)  (-0.8) 
Finland  -0.54  -0.55  -0.45  -0.25  -0.26  -0.12 
(-3.2)  (-3.7)  (-2.8)  (-1.2)  (-1.4)  (-0.6) 
France  -0.17  -0.15  -0.13  -0.41  -0.33  -0.32 
(-1.0)  (-1.0)  (-0.8)  (-2.0)  (-1.9)  (-1.6) 
Germany  0.21  0.28  0.33  0.05  0.16  0.21 
(1.3)  (1.9)  (2.1)  (0.3)  (0.9)  (1.0) 
Italy  -0.42  -0.20  -0.17  -0.51  -0.05  0.06 
(-2.5)  (-1.3)  (-1.0)  (-2.5)  (-0.2)  (0.3) 
Japan  -0.67  -0.60  -0.63  -0.72  -0.79  -0.85 
(-3.7)  (-3.7)  (-3.5)  (-3.2)  (-3.9)  (-3.8) 
Netherlands  0.24  0.09  0.02  0.42  0.22  0.11 
(1.4)  (0.6)  (0.2)  (2.0)  (1.2)  (0.5) 
Norway  -0.32  -0.22  -0.31  0.12  -0.10  -0.09 
(-1.8)  (-1.4)  (-1.8)  (0.6)  (-0.5)  (-0.4) 
Sweden  0.27  0.22  0.25  0.38  0.16  0.37 
(1.7)  (1.5)  (1.6)  (2.0)  (0.9)  (1.9) 
United  Kingdom  -0.15  -0.12  -0.13  -0.84  -0.37  -0.42 
(-0.7)  (-0.8)  (-0.8)  (-3.7)  (-2.1)  (-2.2) 
United  States  0.24  0.58  0.84  -0.33  -0.31  -0.21 
(1.3)  (3.4)  (4.6)  (-1.5)  (-1.5)  (-1.0) 
Source:  Author's  calculations. 
a.  Regressions  pooled  as in table 6, with a dummy variable equal to one  in the case  of EC member countries. 
significant  underimporters  were the United Kingdom  and Japan, with 
the  coefficient  on the  Japanese  dummy  twice  that  on the United  Kingdom. 
Only  Japan  is an underimporter  in both specifications.25 
INTERPRETATION 
These results  reject  the view that  Japanese  manufactured  imports  are 
not  unusually  low. They  also  indicate  that  the superior  quality  of Japanese 
25. A peculiar  overimporteris  Australia,  which  is well known  to have  highly  protective 
barriers  on manufactured  goods. The Australian  dummy  is the result  of having  Japan,  a 
country of similar  distance and much lower import  shares, in the sample. When both 
Japanese  and  Australian  dummies  are  introduced,  however,  the Australian  observation  is 
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products  cannot  explain  Japanese  imports.  Japanese  export  volumes  are 
too small  to  justify Japan's  high  share  of its home  market.  But the results 
leave some issues unresolved  because they do not indicate  the relative 
importance of  export barriers, import barriers, and unusual buyer 
preferences. 
Because, with the exception of Japanese  textiles, Japanese  exports 
were not subject to unusual barriers  in 1970, it seems reasonable to 
interpret the  1970 dummy coefficients as reflecting unusual import 
behavior. The relative stability in the aggregate coefficients in the 
production  share  specification  between 1970  and 1980  suggests  that  this 
behavior  persisted. In some industries,  though, an upward  drift in the 
coefficients  could  reflect  the imposition  of export  restraints.  To interpret 
the coefficient  on the dummy  variables  as a reflection  of differences  in 
preferences,  we must  assume  that  Japan  has different  tastes and  displays 
an abnormal  bias  for home products.  Since most countries  in the sample 
have similar  per capita GDP income levels, with none deviating  more 
than 20 percent  from the group  mean, nonhomotheticity  is an unlikely 
cause.26 
SIMULATED  IMPACT  OF  BARRIERS 
How different  would  Japan's  trade  structure  be if its import  behavior 
were normal given its distance from other producers? The dummy 
variable  coefficients  can be used to provide  a rough  answer. 
In 1980, Japanese manufactured  goods imports and exports were 
valued  at $31.5 billion  and $126  billion, respectively. The coefficient  in 
table 8 indicates  that manufactured  imports  would have been higher  in 
1980  by 59 percent, or $18.6 billion, in the absence of unusual  barriers. 
Initially,  therefore,  removing  these barriers  would reduce  the manufac- 
tured  goods trade  surplus  from $94.5 billion  to $75.9 billion. 
In response  to a rise in imports,  however, the yen would  weaken. As 
implied  by the equation  system  reported  in table 11,  to restore  the current 
account  to its former  level (in yen) with GDP unchanged  would require 
a real yen depreciation  of about 10.5 percent.27  If this depreciation 
26. Correlating  the shares of twenty-two industries in Japanese production and 
domestic  use with shares  in the rest of the sample  suggests  nothing  unusual  about  either 
Japanese  production  (correlation  0.91)  or use (correlation  0.96). 
27. Equations  indicate  elasticities  with  respect  to the real  exchange  rate  of - 0.91 and 
1.07  for  exports  and  imports  of goods and  services, respectively.  See table 11. 538  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1987 
Table 11.  Aggregate Export and Import Volume Equations, Japan,  1970-85a 
World  Summary  statistic 
manu-  Real  S 
factured  Utilization  Real  exchange  Standard  Durbin- 
Dependent  variable  exportsb  ratioc  GDP  rated  error  Watson 
Total exports  1.48  -1.31  ...  -0.91  0.03  2.0 
(36.6)  (2.6)  (-6.6) 
Manufactured exports  1.39  -1.59  . ..  -0.75  0.03  1.7 
(31.2)  (-2.9)  (-5.0) 
Total imports  ...  ...  0.80  1.07  0.04  2.1 
(14.3)  (5.6) 
Manufactured imports  ...  ...  1.84  1.06  0.09  1.9 
(13.2)  (2.3) 
Sources: Author's  calculations  with  data  from  OECD  Economic  Outlook,  OECD  National  Income  Accounts,  and 
United  Nations, UN Monthly  Bulletitn  of Statistics,  various  issues. 
a. All variables  in logs. 
b. Volume  index  of world  exports  of manufactured  goods. 
c. Ratio  of actual  GDP  to "normal"  GDP,  defined  as a nine-year  centered  moving  average  of actual  GDP. 
d. Morgan-Guaranty  real  exchange  rate  index. 
occurred  with prices at home and abroad  fixed in domestic currencies, 
the value of 1980 Japanese manufactured  goods imports and exports 
would then decline  to $44.5  billion  and  $123  billion,  respectively.28  Once 
these general  equilibrium  adjustments  are  allowed  for, removing  unusual 
characteristics  of Japanese manufacturing  import behavior would in- 
crease manufactured  imports  by 41.3 percent and reduce the surplus  in 
manufactured  trade  in 1980  by 16.9  percent, or $16  billion. 
The dummy  variables  estimated  for individual  industries  were used 
to obtain  first-round  effects on import  shares  of the removal  of uniquely 
Japanese  trade  barriers.  The results, in table 12, show that  the structure 
of Japanese trade would alter quite appreciably.  Although its overall 
manufacturing  surplus  would  not change  much,  Japan  would  have  almost 
as much  intra-industry  trade  as the other  countries  in the sample. 
The  findings  in this  section  indicate  that  Japanese  manufactured  goods 
imports  have been reduced significantly  by unusual  trade barriers  and 
preferences.  These factors have a large  effect relative  to manufactured 
imports  but  a much  smaller  effect relative  to the total  value  of all imports. 
It is not surprising,  therefore,  that tests explaining  aggregate  Japanese 
imports  may fail to detect those barriers.29 
28. The equations  (table 11)  indicate  real  exchange  rate  elasticities  of -0.75  and 1.06 
for Japanese  manufactured  exports  and  imports,  respectively. 
29. In 1980, Japan's  aggregate  merchandise  imports  were valued at $139.9 billion. 
Thus the $21.4 billion impact  of trade  barriers  on manufactured  imports  was only 15.3 
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Table 12.  Simulated Values of Japanese Manufactured Imports,  1980 
Correlation 
between 
exports  Ratio  of im- 
and im-  Intra-industry  Mean  export-  ports  to do- 
Item  portsa  trade indexa  import 1.atioa  mestic  use 
Actual value  -0.22  0.30  7.86  0.06 
Simulated value  0.55  0.57  2.21  0.10 
Actual averages, 
other countriesb  0.66  0.70  1.31  0.35 
Source:  Author's calculations.  See text description.  Simulated values calculated using dummy variables in table 4. 
a.  Twenty-one  manufacturing sectors. 
b.  Average  values  of other countries  listed in table 2. 
Price Responsiveness 
By examining the price responsiveness  of Japanese imports, it may 
be possible to determine the nature of the barriers more precisely.  Zero 
price elasticities  would  suggest  quotas due to cartels and government 
policies  such  as  administrative  guidance  and prohibitive  regulations. 
Low  (and nonlinear) price  elasticities  would  suggest  significant fixed 
costs  due to entry barriers.30  Normal price elasticities,  combined  with 
evidence of underimporting, could indicate tariffs, inadequate competi- 
tion  in  the  distribution  system,31 and  unusual  buyer  preferences.32 
Evidence  on income  elasticities  is also useful.  Zero price and income 
elasticities  could indicate fixed quotas. Normal income elasticities  and 
zero price elasticities would suggest quotas set in terms of market share 
rather than in fixed quantities. 
30. New entrants  would  be forced  to recover  the fixed  entry  costs in their  prices. For 
small initial  changes they would be much less responsive. In the aggregate,  therefore, 
import  elasticities  would be lowered in response to an initial appreciation  of the yen. 
However,  responses  would  not  be symmetrical,  linear,  or constant  over  time. See Richard 
R. Baldwin  and Paul R. Krugman,  "Persistent  Trade  Effects of Large Exchange  Rate 
Shocks," Working  Paper  2017  (National  Bureau  of Economic  Research,  August  1986). 
31. Monopolists  set prices equal  to marginal  cost plus a markup  equal  to (1 +  l/ed), 
where ed is the elasticity  of demand.  If competition  to distribute  imported  products  is 
weak, markups  will be high, but lower import  prices  will be reflected  in lower consumer 
prices. While higher  markups  reduce the quantity  sold, they resemble tariffs (if ed is 
constant)  and  will not affect  responsiveness  to price  changes. 
32. If the utility function (U) is Cobb-Douglas,  for example, so that log U equals 
Aljog  H and (1 -  AI) log I, where  H is the domestic  good, and  I the imported  good and 
Al > (1 -  Al), the share  of income spent  on home goods will always be higher  than  that 
spent  on domestic  goods, but  both  would  have unitary  price  and  income  elasticities. O  _  .  t  .  .  .  N  .  >0  .  D  g~~~~~~~0 
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To explore  this  issue, I have  used  the matched  industrial  data  compiled 
by the Commission  of the European  Community.  These data provide 
consistent import  volumes in major  industries  for Japan  and the United 
States. In addition,  I matched  import  prices (unit values in the case of 
the United States)  to domestic  wholesale prices  for data  on ten industry 
groups  comprising  about  80 percent  of manufactured  imports. 
I have estimated  import  demand  functions  that explain  import  quan- 
tities between 1971  and 1985  by real GNP, relative  import  prices, and a 
time trend. Variables  are expressed in logarithms  so that coefficients 
indicate  elasticities. Specifications  using current  and  lagged  income and 
price  terms  with and  without  the trend  term  were tested. The best fitting 
estimates  are reported  in table 13. 
Japanese  finished  manufactured  imports  appear  fairly responsive to 
price. Indeed, in five of the ten industrial  sectors estimated  here, they 
are more responsive than the corresponding  imports of the United 
States.33  The price elasticity estimates and the estimates of the barriers 
obtained  in the previous  section do not correspond.  Chemicals,  in which 
imports  conformed  to normal  patterns,  have the highest  price responses 
(elasticity of  -  2.2). Elasticities  are between  -  1.4 and -  1.5 for under- 
imported  products such as electrical  goods, nonmetallic  minerals,  and 
metal products. On the other hand, price elasticities are low and not 
significantly  different  from  zero in three  of the largest  sectors  of Japanese 
imports,  basic metals (28.3 percent of manufactured  imports);  textiles, 
footwear, and clothing  (7.3 percent  of manufactured  imports);  and  food 
products  (13.1  percent). 
Theory  suggests  that  low price  elasticities  might  indicate  administered 
protection. In fact, there is substantial  evidence of such protection in 
both textiles and food products. Japan maintains quotas on leather 
goods. Recession cartels, accompanied by administrative  limits on 
imports  (and voluntary  export restraints  on Korean goods) have been 
33. Earlier studies of disaggregated  Japanese manufactured  imports do not find 
unusually  low import  price  elasticities.  See, for  example,  Joe A. Stone, "Price  Elasticities 
of Demand  for Imports  and Exports:  Industry  Estimates  for the U.S., the E.E.C. and 
Japan," Review of Economics  and Statistics,  vol. 61 (May 1979), pp. 306-12; William R. 
Cline and others,  Trade Negotiations  in the Tokyo Round: A Quantitative Assessment 
(Brookings, 1978). For a comparison  of these results, see Peter A. Petri, Modelling 
Japanese-American  Trade: A Study ofAsymmetric  Interdependence  (Harvard University 
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implemented in the textiles industry.34  According to  Balassa, food 
products  are a principal  case of administrative  guidance  in Japan.35 
Japanese manufactured  imports are price inelastic in basic metals, 
motor vehicles, textiles, and food-products  amounting  to about half 
the total. They are elastic in sectors that have relatively small import 
shares. Thus although  Japanese products generally have higher price 
elasticities  than  U.S. products,  when  weighted  by their  shares,  Japanese 
imports  have an elasticity of - 0.70 while those of the United States are 
-1.1. 
When the time trends are taken into account, Japanese income 
elasticities are generally between a quarter  and a third those of the 
United  States. This  difference  is somewhat  larger  than  might  be expected 
from those countries' growth rates. Between 1970  and 1985, Japanese 
industrial  production increased at a 4.5 percent rate, as against 2.7 
percent  for the United States and  2.6 percent  for all industrial  countries. 
Table 14 reports similar regressions for aggregate manufacturing 
imports  in Japan, the United States, Italy, France, Germany,  and the 
United Kingdom. The equation for Japan  gives results similar  to the 
disaggregated  version. Indeed,  the unitary  import  price  elasticity  is fairly 
close to the weighted  average  of price  elasticities  from  the disaggregated 
equations.36  This Japanese  import  price elasticity lies in the middle of 
the estimates  in table 13. 
In sum, therefore,  the barriers  that inhibit  Japanese  imports  do not, 
in most cases, prevent  fairly  normal  price responses. These barriers  are 
thus probably  limitations  in the distribution  system and differences in 
buyer  preferences,  a conclusion supported  by Christelow's  finding  that 
the distribution  system marks  up imports  differentially.37 
34. For a detailed  description  of the 1981  recession cartel in textiles and the role of 
MITI,  see Ronald  Dore, "Structural  Adjustment  in  Japan  1970-82"  (Geneva:  International 
Labor  Office). 
35. Balassa, "Japan's  Trade  Policies." 
36. Recent  estimates  of Japanese  manufactured  goods import  price  elasticities  include 
Hooper/Helkie  (-0.90),  the EPA Model (-  1.2), and Spencer  (-0.82).  See William  L. 
Helkie and Peter  Hooper, "The U.S. External  Deficit  in the 1980s,"  in Ralph  C. Bryant 
and others, eds.,  Empirical Macroeconomics  for Interdependent Economies  (Brookings, 
1988);  Naohiro  Yashiro, "Exchange  Rate Adjustment  and Macroeconomic  Policy Coor- 
dination,"  Discussion  Paper  41 (Tokyo:  Economic  Planning  Agency, February  1987);  and 
Grant  H. Spencer, "The World  Trade  Model: Revised Estimates," IMF Staff Papers, 
vol. 31 (September  1984),  pp. 469-98. 
37. "A (1985)  government  survey  of distribution  markups  for domestic  and  imported 
products  found that for whiskeys, candies, edible oils, men's overcoats, and footwear, Robert Z. Lawrence  543 
Table 14.  Equations Explaining Aggregate Real Manufactured Imports, 
Various Countries, 1971-86a 
Relative  Summary statistic 
Real  price  of  Time  Standard  Durbin- 
Country  GDP  imnports  trend  error  Watson 
Franceb  2.69  -  1.11  .  .  .  0.03  1.8 
(22.5)  (2.7) 
Germanyc  2.77  -  0.54  . ..  0.02  1.5 
(40.7)  (3.2) 
Italy  2.72  -2.13d  .  .  .  0.06  1.5 
(16.2)  (3.1) 
Japanc  1.35  -1.01  ...  0.09  1.9 
(5.2)  (-2.6) 
United  Kingdome  2.47  -0.61  0.02  0.02  1.6 
(8.0)  (3.4)  (2.7) 
United States  3.36  -  1.95d  .  .  .  0.06  2.0 
(19.1)  (5.3) 
Source:  Author's  calculations  with  data  from  the OECD  data  base and  International  Monetary  Fund,  International 
Financial  Statistics  data  tape. 
a. Annual  data.  Dependent  variable  is real  manufactured  imports  in each country.  The relative  price  of imports  is 
the ratio  of manufactured  import  prices to domestic  wholesale  prices  for manufactured  goods. All variables  are in 
logs, except  for the time trend.  Numbers  in parentheses  are t-statistics. 
b.  1973-85. 
c. Corrected  for serial  correlation. 
d. Current  and  one-pefiod  lag. 
e.  1972-86. 
f. Current  and  two-period  lags. 
Between early 1985  and April 1987, as measured  by the multilateral 
exchange  rate model of the International  Monetary  Fund (MERM),  the 
yen appreciated  44 percent. Over the same period, Japanese relative 
unit  labor  costs increased  about  22 percent. With  the exception of food 
and textiles, the strong yen should increase the importance of the 
Japanese  market  as a revenue source for foreign exporters. Not only 
will Japan's  trade surplus  be reduced, but the amount  of intra-industry 
trade  should  rise. Indeed, in the first  five months  of 1987,  the volume of 
Japanese  manufactured  goods imports  was 21.5 percent higher  than in 
1985.  Because  import  unit  values were 24.9 percent  lower, however, the 
overall  yen value  had  barely  changed.  In dollars,  manufactured  imports 
increased  from  $36.4  billion  in 1985  to an annual  rate of $50.94  billion.38 
markups  on imports  were double those on domestic products." Christelow,  "Japan's 
Intangible  Barriers,"  p. 14. 
38. For a detailed  analysis of recent Japanese  trade, see Bonnie E. Loopesko and 
Robert  A. Johnson, "Realignment  of the Yen-Dollar  Exchange Rate: Aspects of the 
Adjustment  Process in Japan," International  Finance Discussion Paper 311 (Board of 
Governors  of the Federal  Reserve  System, August  1987). 544  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1987 
Political Implications of Japan's Trade Structure 
Whatever  the causes of Japan's  unusual  trade structure,  its effects 
have been dramatic.  Few international  meetings go by without heated 
accusations against  Japan  and defensive responses. Highly dependent 
on its trading  relationships,  Japan has been forced time and again to 
bend to external  political  pressures.  It has restrained  exports  of textiles, 
steel,  automobiles, and electronic products and ostentatiously pro- 
claimed  a series of major  initiatives  to open its markets. 
Yet Japan  continues  to be the target  of frequent  allegations  of unfair 
trade  practices. Current  trade  legislation  drafted  by the U.S. Congress 
is aimed  primarily  at  Japan.  Both  the House and  Senate  trade  bills  passed 
in 1987  would amend  Section 301 of the Trade  Act to require  the U.S. 
Trade  Representative  to identify countries  that "maintain  a consistent 
pattern of market distorting  trade practices," specifically identifying 
Japan  as such a country.39 
Yet from some standpoints,  the attention  focused on Japan  appears 
peculiar.  For its size, Japan  is not an extraordinary  exporting  nation. In 
1980,  Japanese  manufactured  exports were 13.2 percent of the exports 
of the  thirteen-country  sample  used above. By contrast,  Japan  accounted 
for 18.7  percent of manufactured  goods use within  the sample  and 19.9 
percent of production.  Why is the world able to absorb West German 
manufactured  exports  with  little or no friction  when they are  larger  than 
those of Japan  ($217  billion  as against  $204  billion  in 1986)?  Why, in the 
early 1980s, was the United States able to export more manufactured 
goods than  Japan  with  little  friction?  And  why have the tensions  between 
the United States and Japan  been so heated in recent years, when the 
decline in the U.S. manufactured  goods trade  balance  with Europe  and 
Canada  ($46.5 billion between 1981  and 1986)  has been larger  than the 
decline with Japan  ($38.4  billion)?40 
39. For  an  analysis,  see Robert  E. Litan,  "Is the United  States  Turning  Protectionist?" 
Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association  Forum, vol. 6 (October 1987), pp. 3-8. 
40. Indeed,  the decline  in the U.S. bilateral  balance  with  Japan  has been proportional 
to its 1981  shares  in manufactured  goods trade. See Robert  Z. Lawrence  and Robert  E. 
Litan,  "The  Protectionist  Prescription:  Errors  in Diagnosis  and  Cure,"  BPEA,  1:1987,  pp. 
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The  political  implications  of its trade  structure  explain  why Japan  has 
been singled  out. To be sure, Germany  had  the advantage  of establishing 
its market  share  during  the period  of rapid  international  postwar  growth, 
while since 1973  Japanese  export shares have been growing  rapidly  in 
more stagnant markets. Germany also has the benefit of  virtually 
unimpeded  access to European  Community  markets.  But  a major  reason 
for the better reception of German  manufactured  exports is the high 
value of German  manufactured  imports. Similarly, the mutual inter- 
penetration  of European,  Canadian,  and  American  manufactured  goods 
markets  is substantial.  In 1986,  U.S. manufactured  goods imports  from 
Europe and Canada  were 70 percent and 30 percent more than U.S. 
exports, respectively.41 By contrast, U.S. manufactured  imports  from 
Japan  were five times as large as U.S. manufactured  goods exports to 
Japan. Intra-industry  trade is conducive to maintaining  free trade be- 
cause it sets up counterweight  pressures. Protection  of an industry  is 
less likely when participants  in that industry  have a direct interest in 
selling  in the country  against  which barriers  are being sought. Because 
Japan  imports  so little, firms and workers abroad  will not come to its 
defense  when protection  is sought. 
If Japan  is to participate  fully in the global economy in the decades 
ahead,  it must  reduce  these protectionist  constraints  on its trade.  Given 
its high  domestic saving rates, Japan  will tend to have current  account 
surpluses  in the foreseeable future. One response has been to urge the 
Japanese  to spend  more  of their  incomes. But many  Japanese  argue  that 
the rapid  aging  of the population  compels  high  present  saving.  And since 
developing  countries  have great  demands  for capital,  it would be useful 
for Japan to invest its  savings abroad. Thus, a superior long-term 
approach  would  create the political  conditions  in which Japan  is able to 
run whatever  current  account surplus  it chooses. Indeed, as Stephen 
Marris  has noted, Great Britain ran a current account surplus that 
averaged  4 percent  of its GNP (quite  similar  to Japan's  surplus  in 1986) 
forfifty  years  between 1860  and 1910.42  In Britain's  creation  of a political 
structure  conducive to such surpluses, its empire and powerful naval 
fleet were not inconsequential.  For an economic "Pax Nipponica" in 
41. In 1981,  the United  States  ran  a surplus  of $3.7  billion  in manufactured  goods trade 
with  Europe  and  $2.0  billion  with Canada.  Ibid. 
42.  Stephen Marris, Deficits and the Dollar: The World  Economy at Risk (Washington, 
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which it can trade  more  freely, Japan  will have to cultivate  a hospitable 
international  environment  with more finesse. Even Britain, however, 
had an open home market that smoothed relations with its trading 
partners.  Indeed,  although  its current  account  was in surplus,  throughout 
this period Britain  actually  ran  deficits  in merchandise  trade, offsetting 
them  by a surplus  from  services transactions  in shipping,  insurance,  and 
finance  and  a large  surplus  in net foreign  earnings.43 
A more open domestic market  and  greater  intra-industry  trade  could 
help relieve the political  pressures  faced by Japan.  The Japanese  have 
not been unmindful  of the need for better political relations. Their 
strategy  so far has been to use direct  foreign  investment  and voluntary 
export  restraints."  But voluntary  export  restraints  delay the opening  up 
of Japan,  and  foreign  investment  may also provoke  political  resentment. 
Ultimately,  as the British  example  suggests, an open Japanese  economy 
will be crucial. 
Conclusions 
Japanese trade runs into protectionist constraints more frequently 
than that of other countries, in part because of Japan's  unusual trade 
structure, especially the small value of manufactured  goods imports. 
Overwhelmingly,  such  imports  are  low because  Japan  has a comparative 
advantage  in producing  manufactured  goods and because it is distant 
from its trading  partners. In addition, however, peculiar features of 
Japanese  trade  reduce manufactured  imports  by a substantial  percent- 
age, but a relatively  small  absolute  value. 
In 1980, for example, as equations in this study indicate, unusual 
barriers  and  preferences  reduced  Japanese  manufactured  goods imports 
about 40 percent. The removal of such barriers  would have increased 
the value of Japanese manufactured  imports about $13 billion dollars 
and lowered Japan's trade surplus in manufactured  goods about $16 
billion, or some 17  percent. Japan  would have considerably  more intra- 
industry  trade. 
43.  See Albert H. Imlah, Economic Elements in the PaxBritannica  (Russel and Russel, 
1958). 
44. See Kiyohiko  Fukushima,  "Japan's  Real Trade  Policy," Foreign  Policy, no. 59 
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With the exception of basic metals, food, clothing, and textiles, 
Japanese  imports  of manufactured  goods are  fairly  responsive  to relative 
price changes. This price responsiveness suggests that the abnormally 
low level of manufactured  imports  is due to unofficial  impediments  such 
as unusual  buyer  preferences  and lack of competitiveness  in the distri- 
bution system. To be able to export freely, Japan  needs to improve  its 
international  political environment, open its  domestic market, and 
restructure  its trade. 
Two complementary  elements in such restructuring  would be  a 
stronger  yen supported  by an easier Japanese  fiscal  policy. Japan  could 
temporarily  lower its national  saving  rate  by fiscal measures  and  initiate 
a period of lower current account surpluses. Because imports are 
responsive  to relative  price  changes,  manufactured  goods imports  would 
increase  significantly. 
A period of a strong  yen could have irreversible  effects. Foreigners 
would establish  distribution  networks  and alter distribution  structures, 
enabling  them  to hold  on to markets  even if the yen should  reverse  itself. 
And Japanese producers would sink costs into assembly operations 
abroad  to service the domestic market. 
But even with the yen above current  levels, the Japanese  market  is 
likely to remain relatively closed, and the tensions from the unusual 
intangible  barriers  to imports are likely to continue. Although import 
barriers  may not have a major  impact on the Japanese manufactured 
goods trade surplus, it is still urgent to remove them. Indeed, Japan 
cannot afford  to have such barriers  because its fundamental  structure, 
its need to run large manufactured  goods trade surpluses, makes it 
vulnerable  to political  pressures. 
It  often  seems  expedient,  in the  face of foreign  protectionist  pressures, 
for Japan to limit exports rather than increase imports. But such a 
response does nothing  to create a sustainable  structure  for the future. 
Indeed, by avoiding domestic adjustment,  it has increased pressures 
over the long run. Ultimately, a sustainable  structure  requires  an open 
domestic  market.  Accordingly,  simply allowing  the currency  to appre- 
ciate may not be sufficient.45  Japan should take active measures to 
45. The  welfare  implications  of opening  Japan's  economy  through  a strong  yen, which 
improves  Japan's  terms  of trade,  might  be quite  different  from  removing  import  barriers, 
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increase the competitiveness of its distribution  system and to avoid 
administrative  guidance and selective government  procurement  prac- 
tices.46 
A final consideration  has to do with Japan's agricultural  trade. If 
Japan removes agricultural  trade barriers, whose existence is not a 
matter  of dispute, and increases its agricultural  imports,  it will have to 
shift its spending  patterns  or, more likely, export more manufactured 
goods to pay for the imports.  Creating  a favorable  environment  for these 
exports  by enhancing  two-way  trade  should  be a major  policy objective. 
46. For an analysis of the protectionist  problems  associated with Japanese  policies 
toward  declining  industries,  see Robert  Z. Lawrence,  "A Depressed  View of Policies  for 
Depressed Industries," paper prepared  for conference on U.S.-Canadian  Trade and 
Investment  Relations  with  Japan  (University  of Michigan,  April  2-3, 1987). Comments 
and Discussion 
Paul Krugman: Robert  Lawrence has produced  an important  paper- 
one that offers the seal of approval  of the economics establishment  to 
the charge  that Japan's markets  for manufactures  are tacitly closed to 
imports. His conclusion is that Japan  imports about 40 percent fewer 
manufactures  than it would if its markets  were as open as those of the 
average non-Japanese  OECD country. That is, with freed markets it 
would  import  about  80 percent  more. Given the imprecision  necessarily 
involved,  let's round  it up and  say that  Japan  might,  if it would  only open 
its markets,  double its manufactures  imports. We realize immediately 
that  the paper  is saying  something  very explosive. Let me say at the start 
that  I believe that  Lawrence  is very probably  right,  although  some of the 
methods  used are  a little shaky. I am  much  less certain  about  the political 
economy offered here, which prescribes trade liberalization as the 
answer  to Japan's  worsening  relations  with its trading  partners.  Before 
I turn  to this question,  however, let me review the logic of the economic 
analysis. 
The basic piece of evidence on which the conclusions rest is the 
estimation  of a number  of import  equations  based on a differentiated- 
products  model  of trade  in manufactured  goods. Flatteringly,  the paper 
offers this approach as one based on the monopolistic competition 
models of  trade volume developed by  Elhanan Helpman and me. 
However, Lawrence  extrapolates  considerably  from  the highly  stylized 
analysis  that Helpman  and I offered. We used the assumption  of zero 
transport  costs as a fundamental  simplifying  device; Lawrence,  because 
he is interested  in reality, is obliged to modify that approach  to take 
transportation  costs into account. 
Now the step from the no-transport-cost  theoretical model to the 
realistic  transport-cost-inclusive  empirical  model is not a rigorous  one. 
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In fact, as anyone who has worked on the problem knows, it is very 
difficult  to derive a tractable  multicountry  model of the volume of trade 
in the presence of transport  costs. This task is hard in conventional 
models; it is if anything  harder  when we allow for increasing  returns, 
because there are all kinds of complicating  effects that arise from the 
fact that countries with large domestic markets tend to be favored 
locations for industries subject to large economies of scale. So the 
equations  estimated  here are inspired  by the Helpman-Krugman  model 
rather  than  derived  from  it. 
What  makes  this  worrisome  is that  the role  of transport  costs is crucial 
in assessing Japan's openness to imports. Japan  is the only resource- 
poor advanced country not in Europe, and the only large industrial 
nation with no industrial  neighbors. We need to answer whether the 
geographical  isolation of Japan is enough to explain its low share of 
imported  manufactures,  yet we lack a really well-specified  model that 
lets us assess this issue. The Lawrence  paper  has what I think  is a more 
plausible  test that makes better  use of the available  data  than  any other 
effort to date, but even it is not completely satisfying because the 
empirical  result  is not firmly  grounded  in theory. 
In spite of this unease, I agree that the rough estimate that Japan 
should be importing  about twice as many manufactures  as it does is 
plausible. Let me offer two less formal  pieces of evidence that seem to 
support  this. First, suppose we compare  Japanese  imports  of manufac- 
tures with the "nonlocal" manufactures  imports  of the United States 
and the European Community. In 1984 the United States imported 
manufactures  from sources other than Canada  equal to 4.8 percent of 
GNP; the EC imported  non-EC manufactures  equal to 6.5 percent of 
GNP; Japan's manufactures  imports were only 2.9 percent of GNP. 
Admittedly,  Japan  is poorer  in  resources  than  either  the EC or  the United 
States, which should show up in lower manufactures  imports  as well as 
higher  exports; but Japan  is also smaller  than the other two economic 
units, which would lead us to expect a higher  import  share. So it would 
not be unreasonable  to expect Japan to have a manufactures  import 
share comparable to that of the EC, which would indeed involve a 
doubling  of those imports. 
Second, compare  U.S. trade  with Japan  and that with Germany.  As 
Lawrence  points out, Germany  and Japan  are virtual  twins in their net 
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were 45 percent  of U.S. imports,  whereas  U.S. manufactures  exports  to 
Japan  were  only 23  percent  of U. S. imports.  Once  again,  one can suppose 
that if the Japanese  were as well behaved as the Germans  their import 
share  would  roughly  double. 
Let me now turn to the problem  of political economy. Suppose we 
accept that  Japan  should  be importing  twice as many  manufactures  as it 
now does.  What we  conclude from this depends critically on two 
questions,  one of which the paper  does not answer, the other  of which it 
answers  in a way that  I find  implausible. 
The question  the paper  fails to answer  is why  Japan  imports  less than 
it should. At the beginning  of the paper  two alternative  hypotheses are 
offered:  tacit  government  policy or the "invisible  handshake"  of Japan's 
cartelized  industrial  structure.  It makes a tremendous  difference  which 
of these you believe is the truth.  If government  policy is the villain,  then 
all a liberal-minded  Japanese  government  needs to do is reform  itself. 
Japan's  economic glasnost might  be hard  to sell to its bureaucrats,  but 
we might have some hope that forceful leadership could change the 
situation  quickly.  If the problem  is instead  rooted  in industrial  structure, 
then the government  presumably  would have to engage in a long-term 
program  of antitrust  and moral  suasion to bring  down the barriers.  The 
paper  gives us no clue as to which story is the right  one, and thus as to 
how patient  Japan's trade partners  will have to be. My reading  of the 
anecdotal evidence is that industrial  structure is unfortunately  very 
important  in the closure of Japan's  markets,  and thus that  even with the 
best will Japan's government  cannot deliver trade liberalization  at all 
rapidly. 
The 8.96 million yen  question, however, is  whether opening of 
Japanese  markets  would really ease trade frictions. Here I just do not 
agree with the paper's premise. What Lawrence does is to compare 
Japan  with Germany,  which runs a manufactures  trade  surplus  as large 
relative to GNP as Japan's, but with seven times as large an import 
share-and which excites little hostility from the United States. How- 
ever, even a liberal  Japan  would not look like Germany-it would still, 
on the paper's estimate, export three times as much in the way of 
manufactures  as it imports,  essentially  because Japan  is not in the middle 
of Europe. Furthermore,  I cannot believe that lack of friction with 
Germany  can be explained by German  manufactures  imports. Recall 
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United States sells Germany  only 45 cents' worth of manufactures  for 
every dollar it buys, as compared with Japan's 23 cents. Is it really 
plausible  that the difference  in popular  perception  can be attributed  to 
the fact that the voice of the worker who loses his job to German 
competition is drowned  out by the voices of 0.45 exporters, while his 
colleague who lost out to Japanese  competition  has only 0.23 exporters 
to argue  with?  I am not convinced. 
My own alternative hypothesis is that conflict with Japan is due 
primarily  to a different  aspect  of its trade  performance-the rapid  growth 
of Japanese exports and the rising Japanese market share. Unlike the 
Germans, the Japanese keep invading new markets that the United 
States regards as its private preserves. My guess is that this creates 
tension for both rational  reasons, such as the problem  of adjustment  to 
increased competition, and irrational  ones, such as fear and envy. Of 
course this is a very pessimistic  diagnosis,  since it says that  the only way 
for Japan  to have more  friends  is to be less successful. We can only hope 
that the paper is right, and that a liberal Japan would be able to run 
current  account surpluses  in peace. I  just wouldn't  count on it. 
General  Discussion 
A number  of participants  questioned Lawrence's choice of model 
with which  to analyze  trade  differences  between Japan  and  other  OECD 
countries. Martin  Baily wondered why the Helpman-Krugman  model 
had been chosen over a model such as Heckscher-Ohlin, in which 
comparative  advantage  is critical and specialization  occurs in produc- 
tion. If the Japanese  do not have a taste for product  diversity, then the 
latter model is more relevant, and low imports  of manufactured  goods 
would be expected because Japan has a comparative advantage in 
producing  manufactured  goods. In light  of this model, William  Branson 
reasoned  that  the peculiar  thing  may  be that  Japan  imports  any manufac- 
tured goods at all. Lawrence conceded that comparative advantage 
ideally should be integrated into the model. But with differentiated 
goods, Japan  nonetheless would have significant  imports  of manufac- 
tured  goods according  to the Helpman-Krugman  model. Hendrik  Hout- 
hakker  believed the model's assumption  of unitary  income elasticities 
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restrictive  in this and other  respects. He also observed  that  Japan  is not 
as geographically  isolated for purposes of trade as its distance from 
Europe and the United States would suggest. Geographically  Japan's 
natural  trading  partners  are the newly industrialized  countries in the 
Pacific  Basin, so one might  examine the volume of imports  from those 
countries  for evidence of import  restraints. 
William  Brainard  elaborated  on Paul  Krugman's  remark  in his formal 
comment on the paper that the strong conclusions of the Helpman- 
Krugman  model  need  not  apply  once transportation  costs are  introduced. 
In the presence of such costs, the cross-price  elasticities at the product 
level would  be crucial  in determining  import  and  export  shares. If goods 
were close substitutes,  even minor  transportation  costs would  dominate 
trade  patterns.  He therefore  questioned  whether  the regression  results 
presented  by Lawrence,  even though  they allow  for  transportation  costs, 
provide a test of the Helpman-Krugman  model and whether they can 
identify  departures  from normal  patterns  of imports  and exports in the 
presence of transportation  costs. Accepting Lawrence's verdict that 
Japan  spent relatively  less on imported  manufactured  goods than  other 
industrial  countries, Brainard  reasoned that the paper had not persua- 
sively demonstrated  why this was so.  In the same vein, Lawrence 
Summers  emphasized  that Lawrence's statistical  analysis did not pro- 
vide proof  of "trade  barriers"  in Japan.  The low level of imports  could 
be explained  by differences  in tastes, language,  and  geographic  location. 
Marcus  Noland questioned  whether  Lawrence's  results  demonstrate 
any greater  Japanese  import  restriction  than  have previous  studies. For 
example,  the study  by Bergsten  and  Cline  that  Lawrence  cites concludes 
that  Japan  does not have above-normal  protection.  Adjusting  the Berg- 
sten-Cline  estimates  to make  them apply  to total Japanese  trade  implies 
that Japan's import  restrictiveness is in the range of $7 billion to $15 
billion, which is in Lawrence's range. Noland also questioned the 
author's  reliance  on expansionary  fiscal policy in Japan  to help reduce 
the  trade  surplus.  He noted  that  estimates  of that  effect are small  relative 
to the magnitude  of Japan's trade surplus, both globally and with the 
United States. An analysis by the Bank of Japan  concluded  that over a 
two-year  period, the government's  recently announced  plan to provide 
a $6 trillion  yen stimulus  package  would lower the total Japanese  trade 
surplus  by $3 billion  to $3.5 billion and lower the bilateral  surplus  with 
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somewhat  higher  in the first  case and around  $1.3 billion in the second 
case. Given such small effects of a fiscal stimulus, Noland concluded 
that significant  reduction  of the trade  surplus  would occur only if a high 
yen changes the structural  features of the Japanese  economy, such as 
the distribution  system, that hamper  trade. 
Charles Schultze questioned whether an increase in intra-industry 
trade would shield Japan from protectionist measures, as Lawrence 
hoped. In his view, efforts to obtain  protection  are not organized  along 
broad  industry  lines, but  rather  arise  from  competitive  fears  of producers 
representing  fairly specific product categories. Greater  intra-industry 
trade, as measured  using SIC codes, would not remove these political 
pressures  to stem foreign  competition. 